Just a week after publishing our discovery of Trickbot’s networkDLL, the FortiGuard Labs monitoring system has found a new module called squlDll that is being actively distributed to the banking trojan’s victims.
This new component is one of Trickbot’s several modules used for scraping email addresses from the machines of its victims. It targets Microsoft SQL Servers using legitimate libraries, similar to what we observed in its mailcollection module. Moreover, it is able to scrape credentials from the victim by force enabling WDigest authentication and utilizing the popular Mimikatz tool.
As usual with Trickbot, the new module is comprised of embedded binaries that we’ve seen in previous modules.
One of the familiar modules is screenLocker, which was previously assumed to be an underdeveloped lock-for-ransom capability. However, our analysis now suggests a different and simpler purpose for it.
Sub-modules are written and executed in the user’s %TEMP% directory and then deleted after their functions are completed. As in previous Trickbot modules, every time a sub-module is executed by the loader, a shared memory is allocated by the main loader that the sub-module can access and use to store collected data. The main loader then retrieves the data through the shared memory.
The first sub-module to be executed is sqlFinder, whose main function is to list all the network-visible instances of Microsoft SQL Servers from the compromised machine. To achieve this, it uses the legitimate SQL Server Database Management Objects (SQLDMO.DLL) COM interface to list all available SQL server instances on the victim’s network.
Another sub-module is executed that gathers email addresses from the collected SQL server instances.
It uses the ADO COM object interface to talk to the database. At first, it attempts to connect to all available SQL servers using Windows Authentication mode. If the user that is currently logged in on the infected machine has permission to connect to the SQL server, the connection attempt succeeds.
After successfully connecting to a SQL server instance, the next thing that it does is to search for target databases. All SQL Server System Databases – such as “master”, “tempdb”, “model” and “msdb” – are skipped. From the target databases found, it queries all the tables using its information schema and then tries to collect emails.
In an attempt to extract credentials from the victim system, it uses the popular Mimikatz tool. One of the methods it uses is to target WDigest credentials that are stored in the LSA memory in plain text. When Microsoft released Windows 8.1 they introduced a way to mitigate such an attack by adding a switch in the form of the registry entry
Basically, the storing of WDigest credentials in memory can be disabled by setting the value of this entry to ‘0’. Otherwise, it can be set to ‘1’ as some services rely on WDigest authentication. In Windows 8.1 and newer versions, this feature is disabled by default. In 2014 Microsoft released a security update to integrate this setting into some older versions of Windows.
To make sure that the tool succeeds in obtaining plain text credentials, this malware module makes sure that WDigest authentication is enabled by modifying/adding the registry entry.
However, the user must log in after the feature is enabled in order for the credentials to be stored in the memory. This is where the screenLocker module comes into play.
A number of researchers had previously assumed that this module was a screen lock ransom in the making. However, based on its usage here, it has a much simpler purpose. It initiates a routine to lock the screen of the victim to in order to somehow force the victim into entering their login credentials in order to log back in. This function is only executed on Windows 8/Server 2012 or newer versions.
An embedded Mimikatz library is then decrypted and directly loaded in memory, which reduces the malware’s physical file trace in the victim’s system. The library’s export getUserPasswordPairs is then called to start gathering credentials.
Trickbot is being actively updated in the wild, and this is just one of the several modules that we’ve found being pushed out to victims in the past few weeks. Most of these modules are focused on gathering credentials and scraping email addresses using different techniques – more addresses means more targets.
As always, FortiGuard Labs will be on the lookout for any major developments of this botnet.
-= FortiGuard Lion Team =-
Fortinet users are protected with the following solutions:
b001d11ab1fc2b5ec52a79f6cfe5379a504bc6a79610e2a7dc6a04e74dd5df17 (main trickbot) - W32/Trickbot.KAD!tr
079dc54026cc88aa72ca3111e1a7416a354ed95e6d0e8adaa0e48f6965d90256 (squlDLL module) - W32/Trickbot.KAD!tr
696888c3131da282866fc339b78bd6d96b168a6ecfd78c3050fd40b7ebe484f2 (squlDLL module) - W32/TrickBot.AK!tr
7ea10d92fcd48f3a35743643acd815496a6eb97a8ad1ed15c294034a09f9a579 (squlDLL module) - W32/TrickBot.AK!tr
9d1393c11c4ead9d78d57ba0a04fa4ca1d66eba50dc0e5f99b43772ef0ad9995(squlDLL module) - W32/TrickBot.AK!tr
93b057124ba35a9db9da7c04dfc2ccbbeddb4a0658e0376d1f9a11a2eabe32c4(mailCollector) - W32/Trickbot.KAD!tr
5299d604945baf69032681ce110add6014501556eaafbeadc1e4e5d84b526541(sqlFinder) - W32/Trickbot.KAD!tr
78f9394590eae9c2d68ff890709b9eb6ef5654d7a5c19dc0ee1b1b82a3c75da2(screenLocker) - W32/TrickBot.AK!tr
93522b01a8335630a0903303a336bbd7013eeeefaac6efdf7320bb6623c88ed8(mimikatz) - Riskware/Mimikatz
https[:]//220.127.116.11:449 (main Trickbot)