FortiGuard Labs recently discovered an ongoing DeathRansom malicious campaign. Our first blog on this new variant was devoted to a technical analysis of the samples that had been gathered. In this second part, we will try to shed a light on how this DeathRansom campaign is connected with other campaigns, and who might be behind them.
We start our investigation with the sample 13d263fb19d866bb929f45677a9dcbb683df5e1fa2e1b856fde905629366c5e1, which was mentioned in our previous blog. This sample has debug paths, but we could not recognize the language used. In addition, it has nine resources, with a LANG_SLOVAK identifier constant (0x041B) in the resource section. This means that the sample could have been compiled on a machine with a Slovak language installed by default.
We tried to translate a PDB path from Slovak by splitting the words in different ways and then feeding the results to various automatic translation services. However, none of these attempts led to a correct translation. In fact, the word “duzuk” was recognized by Google Translate not as Slovak, but as Basque (for the English “you have”).
A Basque word was an intriguing lead, since this sample was downloaded from a domain in the .es domain zone (Spain). We believe that this domain was hacked, therefore we will not disclose the domain name here.
The name of the sample was also interesting: Wacatac_2019-11-20_00-10.exe. The word “Wacatac” can be translated from Basque in several different meaningful ways, so we decided to dig deeper.
Since the file name has a clearly distinguishable name-date-time construction, we decided to search for this pattern among all known files. Nine files were found. Their details are provided in Figure 3.
Again, we were a little disappointed: the resource language ID’s were changed from Nepali to Slovak then to Neutral then back to Slovak at a very fast pace. In addition, the debug paths look like machine-generated gibberish rather than any paths a human programmer would use.
Therefore, we had to conclude that a Basque trace was just a coincidence. However, the Slovak and Nepali traces are not. Most probably, they were intentionally inserted to mislead potential investigators.
In spite of these disappointments, these new samples also gave us an important clue. One of the samples shown on Figure 3 was downloaded not from the hacked .es site, but from a different URL:
The link was not accessible, and neither was the scat01 profile itself:
Nevertheless, when we searched for other malicious samples which attempted to access this Bitbucket directory, we found an interesting connections log from May 2019. The sample was related to the Vidar stealer malware family.
The name pattern has an obvious resemblance to our Wacatac sample:
Next, we decided to search among the connections logs for a connection by the URL mask
One of the connections logs found on VirusTotal is shown on Figure 6 (sample dc9ff5148e26023cf7b6fb69cd97d6a68f78bb111dbf39039f41ed05e16708e4).
Let’s now analyze these connections. The connections shown in the green frame should be familiar to anyone who has dealt with Vidar stealers, as they are standard Vidar libraries used to extract passwords from different browsers.
The connection shown in the red frame is an attempt to access an executable file with another Wacatac name. Unfortunately, this link was not accessible during the Vidar sample sandbox analysis, therefore we don’t have a Wacatac_2019-11-16_17-03.exe sample.
Nevertheless, as you may remember from our first blog, DeathRansom uses the name ‘Wacatac’ to store crypto keys in a registry. Therefore, we have strong reason to believe that the inaccessible Wacatac_2019-11-16_17-03.exe sample was another DeathRansom variant.
Therefore, based on the same “malware hosting”, the same name pattern, and the fact that the Vidar sample tried to download a DeathRansom sample, we can conclude that the Vidar campaign and the DeathRansom campaign are run by the same actor, who uses scat01 as a Bitbucket profile name as well as a name for some malware samples.
We decided to dig deeper and see what could be found about this scat01.
We started to look for fresh malware containing the string scat01 in it. Here is a short summary of our findings:
The last sample was downloaded from a root folder of the website gameshack[.]ru. This could mean that attackers somehow control this webserver. Therefore, we decided to see what else could be found on this webserver.
We found many malicious samples, which were downloaded directly from a root folder on Gameshack[.]ru. We decided to analyze all available samples and extract any information that could help us in our investigation.
The malware samples “hosted” on the gameshack[.]ru website were downloaders. This means that their purpose was to download a payload and run it. The main payload was of two types:
The Evrial stealer samples were not obfuscated and contained the same “Owner” field – “scat01”.
The Supreme miner samples were obfuscated by “NULL SHIELD” (Confuser variant) and had an e-mail embedded: vitasa01[@]yandex.ru.
Figure 11 shows part of the strings from the miner “Supreme.exe” (sample 1e1fcb1bcc88576318c37409441fd754577b008f4678414b60a25710e10d4251). This miner also had the Evrial stealer inside its body:
As you can see, this sample uses the same iplogger service for counting the infected hosts as the DeathRansom samples (see our recent blogpost for details.)
The Evrial stealer inside has the same “scat01” ownership:
As you can see, the website “gameshack[.]ru” is controlled by attackers and they distribute malicious samples with scat01 attribution strings inside.
Here is a short summary of the info about the attackers that we have found so far, including the spread of malware families associated with them:
As well as attribution info:
It seems obvious that these attackers use a Russian email service and a Russian domain zone .ru. In addition, we must remember that DeathRansom performs a check for the system language, and it will not encrypt files if it detects locales from an ex-USSR country.
In addition, when we analyze the stealers used by this group, we find that they can be purchased on Russian underground forums. Therefore, we decided to continue our search there.
Once we searched for “scat01” and “vidar” on the Russian underground forums, we found a person with the same nickname providing a review (in Russian) of the Vidar stealer:
We found another post left by scat01 on another forum. This time it concerns the Evrial stealer. He is afraid that someone might access his logs from that Evrial stealer, as all the information goes to the malware seller’s servers.
Another post with a review was found on another Russian underground forum. This time the review is for Supreme miner:
Moreover, a user with the same name was active on yet another Russian underground forum (from now on, we will refer to this underground forum as Russian underground forum #4). The user is currently banned for having multiple accounts with different names. Please pay attention to the profile picture used here.
Now, having found his/her profiles on the underground forums, we next extended our search, comparing the information. One interesting piece we discovered is a product review on Yandex.Market – the same company that provides the email service in the @yandex.ru domain.
In the review there is no text (only a score), but we can see its location. The review was made from Aksay. Aksay is a small Russian town near Rostov-on-Don (we will come back to this clue a little later).
Another important clue here is the username of the reviewer account: vitasa01. Therefore, it is highly probable that this reviewer has access to the email vitasa01[@]yandex.ru, which we have seen in previous malicious samples.
Also, please pay attention to the picture used in this profile. It is the same picture shown in Figure 15. Therefore, we have a triple match:
At this point, we are pretty sure that this Yandex profile is related to the scat01 profile we found on the Russian underground forum #4 as well as to the malware distributed from gameshack[.]ru. But how can we find the possible real identity of this author? We decided to see what info we could find about gameshack[.]ru itself.
We found an interesting YouTube channel that promotes the website gameshack[.]ru. The link to gameshack[.]ru is named: “our game portal.”
The username given here is “SoftEgorka.” “Egorka” is a diminutive for the Russian name “Egor.” The avatar picture also refers to gameshack[.]ru.
Another interesting piece of information we found is a Skype link. In figure 20, you can see that it refers to the skype username SoftEgorka:
When we searched for a “SoftEgorka” skype user, we found the following user profile on the same Russian underground forum #4. This time the username “Super info” is used.
The Skype address corresponds to the YouTube channel discussed above. The user states that he lives in Italy. Moreover, searching further for his messages, we found another confirmation that this could be true:
By digging further among Super Info posts, we found an announcement about game accounts sales (Steam, WoT, Origin). Here we should note that stealers observed above are capable of stealing passwords from different games and game distribution platforms. This more indirect evidence that Super Info may be connected to the ongoing stealers campaign.
In the contacts section of the sale, you find “Skype: SoftEgorka” as well as the WebMoney ID 372443071304. This same WMID is mentioned in another post from the same user. It is also related to Steam accounts for sale. And this time, another skype profile is mentioned: nedugov99
Searching again, this time for this new Skype ID, an old advertisement for the sale of a game account shows up:
Here, we can see several important pieces of information:
User name: undefined_Nedugov
The skype id: nedugov99
The phone: +7951****311
Vkontakte SNS id: id154704666
We checked the mobile phone number and it belongs to the Rostov-on-Don region.
Next, we checked out the VK id154704666 profile:
The name “Egor” corresponds to one of the underground nicknames, “SoftEgorka,” and the surname “Nedugov” corresponds to the Skype account “nedugov99”. According to the profile, this individual lives in Rostov-on-Don. Remember that the Yandex review made by scat01 was done from Aksay – a small town near Rostov-on-Don.
And even more interesting, he is following (or maybe even administrating?) the “Gameshack[.]ru official group”. The link to the same group is found in the YouTube profile shown in Figures 20-21.
Here an astute reader might ask: “Rostov-on-Don? But what about Italy, mentioned in Figures 21-22?” To get an answer, we have to visit Egor’s Instagram page:
As we might learn from his Instagram and Facebook accounts, he indeed lived in Italy for some time.
There is one more thing here. At this point in the investigation, we asked ourselves: “what if scat01 and SoftEgorka are different actors? The former one compiles malware and the later one “hosts” it on Gameshack[.]ru portal?” Obviously, we have connections via gameshack[.]ru and geographical connections, but what if they are friends and live in the same region?
Well, we found yet another clue: the profile on csgo-stats[.]net is shown in Figure 29. The user with the username scat01 names himself as Egor (Russian: Егор). We must note that the name “Egor” is rare in Russia.
We also found many other profiles of the same actor. According to information on underground forums, this person is responsible for account stealing, carding, malware distribution, and even the phishing and scamming of his forum mates. That is why nearly all his accounts on underground forums were eventually banned.
FortiGuard Labs established a significant connection between the ongoing DeathRansom and Vidar malware campaigns. They share the naming pattern and infrastructure used. We also found evidence that a Vidar sample tried to download the DeathRansom malware.
We believe that an actor with the nickname scat01 could be responsible for the latest DeathRansom attack, as well as other malicious attacks. We also found evidence of strong Russian roots in the malware being distributed.
Based on the evidence left on Russian underground forums, we were able to find a person who seems to likely be behind these malicious campaigns.
All samples mentioned in this article are detected by the FortiGuard antivirus engine:
05b762354678004f8654e6da38122e6308adf3998ee956566b8f5d313dc0e029 - W32/Kryptik.GYME!tr
0cf124b2afc3010b72abdc2ad8d4114ff1423cce74776634db4ef6aaa08af915 - W32/Kryptik.GYQI!tr
13d263fb19d866bb929f45677a9dcbb683df5e1fa2e1b856fde905629366c5e1 - W32/Kryptik.ANT!tr
2b9c53b965c3621f1fa20e0ee9854115747047d136529b41872a10a511603df8 - W32/GenKryptik.DYFO!tr
4bc383a4daff74122b149238302c5892735282fa52cac25c9185347b07a8c94c - W32/GenKryptik.DYBP!tr
6247f283d916b1cf0c284f4c31ef659096536fe05b8b9d668edab1e1b9068762 - W32/GenKryptik.DXWB!tr
66ee3840a9722d3912b73e477d1a11fd0e5468769ba17e5e71873fd519e76def - W32/Kryptik.GYMH!tr
dc9ff5148e26023cf7b6fb69cd97d6a68f78bb111dbf39039f41ed05e16708e4 - W32/GenKryptik.DXWQ!tr
f78a743813ab1d4eee378990f3472628ed61532e899503cc9371423307de3d8b - W32/GenKryptik.DXWH!tr
fedb4c3b0e080fb86796189ccc77f99b04adb105d322bddd3abfca2d5c5d43c8 - W32/Kryptik.GYQI!tr
a45a75582c4ad564b9726664318f0cccb1000005d573e594b49e95869ef25284 - W32/Generic!tr.pws
e767706429351c9e639cfecaeb4cdca526889e4001fb0c25a832aec18e6d5e06 - MSIL/Agent.QJH!tr
1e1fcb1bcc88576318c37409441fd754577b008f4678414b60a25710e10d4251 - MSIL/CoinMiner.AHY!tr
The FortiGuard Web Filtering service blocks the following URLs as malicious:
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