Industry Trends
Ever since the Mirai DDoS attack was launched a few weeks ago, we have received a number of questions that I will try to answer here. If you have more follow-up questions, please let me know!
The presumed developer goes under the pseudonym of 'Anna Senpai' on Hackforums - an English-speaking hacker forum.
His/her account on the forum is recent (July 2016). and was probably created when he/she started working on Mirai. For example:
The account does not reveal any personal data, apart from that Anna Senpei poses as a clever person, well informed on cybercriminality.
His/her (actually, I'd vote for "he,” but that's a personal guess!) country of origin is unknown. The only possible hints are the following - but they could all be false leads:
Finally, note that "Anna Senpai" is very probably the developer of Mirai, but may not have been involved in all of the DoS attacks attributed to Mirai. Indeed, as the source code was publicly released on Sept 30, 2016, other individuals or cybercriminal groups may have downloaded and used it. Some will say this strategy is quite shrewd to complicate attribution. ;) On a positive note, inspection of the source code makes the malware easier to understand and detect. It may be viewed on several github repositories: here, here and here.
The most recent attack on Dyn was claimed by a group known as New World Hackers in retaliation for Ecuador's rescinding Internet access to WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who has been granted asylum at their embassy in London. Two members of this group said they did it to "test power.” So far, this claim hasn't been backed up by other data.
For other attacks: see the first question. Attribution is more difficult because the source code is now public.
The source code does not implement any particular "exploit" and is therefore relatively easy to write. It is, however, quite well written, and the implementation of all types of floods requires some network programming knowledge.
Anyway, contrary to general belief, a malware need not be "advanced" to be efficient: the KISS principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) works very well for malware...
Date |
Where |
Rate |
Comments |
---|---|---|---|
Oct 21, 2016 |
1.2 Tbps? |
Some of the attacks were coming from hosts infected with Mirai. Impacted Twitter, Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, Spotify and Netflix. New World Hackergroup claimed responsibility. Size of botnet: 100,000. |
|
Sept 22, 2016 |
OVH |
1 Tbps |
145,607 cameras and DVRs |
Sept 13, 2016 |
620 Gbps |
More info from host Akamai |
|
Aug 17, 2016 |
280 Gbps |
Size of the botnet: 49,657 unique IPs. Most from CCTV cameras, DVRs and routers. |
Comparing |
Tsunami |
Mirai |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Date |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2015 |
2016 |
2016 |
Aliases |
Kaiten |
Gayfgt, Bashlite |
|
KTN-Remastered, KTN-RM |
|
|
Propagation via IP scanning |
|
Telnet (23) |
On port 10073 or 23 |
SSH (22) |
Telnet (23) |
Telnet |
Password brute force |
|
Yes |
Yes, list provided by C&C |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Implemented attacks |
HTTP Flood |
Send emails, UDP and TCP packets |
DNS Hijacking |
|
Various UDP, TCP floods |
UDP, TCP, DNS, GRE floods |
Kills competing processes (e.g other malware) |
|
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
|
Yes |
Botnet communication channel |
IRC |
|
Port 10073 |
|
IRC |
Ports 23 and 101 |
After infection |
FTP access |
|
|
Transfers a downloader matching the infected device's architecture |
|
|
Targeted devices |
Infected Linux Mint ISO in 2016 |
Router, cameras |
Linux based system, in particular, consumer routers |
India, in particular ,Ubiquiti Air OS router |
Linux-based systems |
CCTV, DVR, router |
Goal |
DoS |
DoS ? |
Capture unencrypted cookies on social networks and perform illegitimate follows or likes |
DoS |
DoS |
DoS |
Notable keywords in the code |
tsunami |
gayfgt |
|
|
KTN2 |
Mirai |
Largest botnet |
|
120,000 |
|
|
|
140,000 (max. approx 300,000 according to Anna Senpai) |
Note. This table might be incomplete. Also please report any errors.
We deduce this from two different points:
Yes, it can. Mirai targets Unix systems using busybox whether they are IoT or not.
In Mirai, the part that is specific to IoT is the list of telnet credentials it tries to brute force. Some of those default credentials are specific to a given brand and model of IoT, and thus show Mirai targets it. On the other hand, however, some default credentials, such as admin/123456, are generic and would certainly apply to non-IoT hosts as well.
On several of those IoT devices, the password is hardcoded in the firmware, and the tools to change it are not provided.
Given the situation, there are several ways to check that the attack specifically comes from Mirai:
Yes, of course! Fortiguard researchers have developed both AV and IPS signatures to detect Mirai. It is reported as "Linux/Mirai.A!tr" at the AV level, and as "Mirai.Botnet" at the IPS level.
Some advice:
Thanks to David Maciejak for his review and inputs.
-- the Crypto Girl